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THE COURT OF APPEALS, 194 TERM
yet guilty of the lower. 5 In People v. Mussenden6 the court found such a situation,
where three of defendant's confreres accosted complainant (while defendant
waited in their car), assaulted him, and unsuccessfully attempted to take his wallet.
In their defense they alleged that complainant's entire story was mendacious, that
they had merely asked him for directions when he became excited and created a
scene. The Grand Jury charged in separate counts (1) Attempted Robbery, first
degree; (2) Attempted Grand Larceny, first degree; (3) Assault, second degree.
The trial judge submitted only the first count to the jury, which the Court of
Appeals held to be proper.
The dissent argued that the jury would have been warranted in viewing
defendant's conduct as not amounting to an attempt, 7 or merely as second degree
Assault, if they chose to disregard that part of complainant's story relating to his
wallet.8 Therefore defendant's rights were substantially prejudiced when the jury
was placed in the dilemma of either acquitting or convicting on the maximum
count. Since the defendant chose to stand or fall on his version of the facts, it
does not appear that his rights were stibstantially prejudiced when the trial judge
refused to charge crimes of which defendant could have been guilty only on highly
conjectural views of the testimony which were not even urged by defendant
during trial.
Sentencing
The case of People v. Tower presented the anomaly of a defendant's contending that his prior record proved he was beyond redemption, 10 and hence the
sentencing judge erred in placing him in a correctional institution (maximum
term: three years);11 if sentence of a punitive nature had been pronounced, only
one year could have been imposed for his unlawful entry.' 2 Defendant also contended that the trial judge's recommendation that defendant not be released until
he had served the maximum term was error. The court held the sentencing court
was free to conclude that defendant was not incapable of rehabilitation even
5. Peopld v. Moran, 246 N. Y. 100, 102-3; 158 N. E. 35, 36 (1927); People v.
Schleiman, 197 N. Y. 383, 390; 90 N. E. 950, 953 (1910).
6. 308 N. Y. 558, 127 N. E. 2d 551 (1955).
7. People v. Rizzo, 246 N. Y. 334, 158 N. E. 888 (1927); People v. Werblow,
241 N. Y. 55, 148 N. E. 786 (1925).
8. That this is within the province of the jury, see People v. Rytel, 284 N. Y.
242, 245; 30 N. E. 2d 578, 580 (1940).
9. 308 N. Y. 123, 123 N. E. 805 (1954).
10. N. Y. CORRECTION LAW §203 (e) provides "This article shall not apply to
any person who is . . . (3) Insane, or mentally or physically incapable of being
substantially benefitted by being committed to a correctional or reformatory
institution."
11. Id., §203 (b): "The court in imposing sentence shall not fix or limit
the term of imprisonment of any person sentenced to any such penitentiary. The
shall not exceed three years."
term of such imprisonment ...
12. N. Y. PENAL LAv §§405, 1937.
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though his record was bad and he himself maintained that he was beyond the pale.
In addition, though the trial court exceeded its powers in recommending that
defendant serve the maximum term, this was not reversible error; proper procedure
would be followed when the determination as to his release was made.
The Court thus tacitly recognized that it cannot police the discretion of trial
judges as to whether an offender is incorrigible, even when the trial court (as
here) betrays its true motivation for using the Correction Law machinery. If the
trial court wishes to utilize this to imprison defendants for a longer period of
time than would be possible by using the determinate sentences, and then refuses
to concur in the Parole Board's recommendation for an early release,13 judicial
review is powerless to intervene. It is deplorable that a trial judge may thus subvert
the clear legislative intent to rehabilitate offenders by using the corrective statutes
to impose a heavier sentence than a strict punishment statute would allow.

Procedure; Appeal
In People v. Fromen,14 after a conviction had been reversed by the Appellate
Division,15 the state appealed, but they failed to note the case for argument for
more than seven months. The Court, in a per curiam opinion, held that the appeal
must be dismissed.
The Code of Criminal Procedure § 536 provides unequivocally that failure
by either party to bring an appeal to argument within ninety days after it is
granted, in the absence of any enlargement will result in a dismissal of the appeal
on the theory that it has been abandoned. The Court has been very liberal in the
past in excusing delays, even where both parties have been remiss in bringing
the appeal to argument,'8 or counsel misinterpreted the law,17 or assigned counsel
was lax in noting the argument.' 8 In People v.Solomon,' 9 however, the Court
warned against future delays of this type, and the instant case is indicative of
their change of policy. It is suggested, however, that where strict application of
13. N. Y. CORRECTION LAW §204 (a)-2; "The parole commission shall have
power to: Parole . . . provided the . . . court who made the commitment
shall ... approve in writing such parole ......
14. 308 N. Y. 324, 125 N. E. 2d 591 (1955).
15. 284 App. Div. 576, 132 N. Y. S. 2d 376 (4th Dep't 1954).
16. People v. Sprager, 215 N. Y. 266, 109 N. E. 247 (1915), three and a half
year delay excused.
17. People v. Solomon, 296 N. Y. 85, 70 N. E. 2d 404 (1946), nine month
delay excused.
18. People v. Nelson, 188 N. Y. 234, 80 N. E. 1029 (1907), delay of one year
excused.

19. See Note 17, supra.

